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NEW YORK ECONOMIC REVIEW

The New York Free Banking Era:
Deregulation or Reregulation?
Andrew Economopoulos*

The deregulation of the banking market is a frequently debated pol icy
issue . 1 Proponents of deregulation claim that free market forces would
improve market efficiency. Th e basis f or thei r argument is grounded in the
work and ten ets of Adam Smith . Deregulation opponents claim that a bank
market left unfettered would disrupt th e financial market; bank
mismanagement, failures, and panics would pervade the market and cause
distrust of the banking system . Opponents of deregulation derive their
beliefs f orm actual historical experiences rather than theory . Many
opponents point to a period of American banking history, called the Free
Banki ng Era (1838-1863), in whi ch banks entered the market without
government sanction . The traditional accounts depict a period of financial
chaos; "wildcat' banking, large noteholder losses, counterfeit banknotes
and bank failures were commonplace . Opponents contend that the turmoil
during the free banking period could again occur if th e banking market
were deregulated )
The arguments put forth by opponents can be contested on two
grounds. First, several recent studies have shown that "wildcat" banking,
large noteholder losses and bank failures were limited to a few states. The
evidence also indicates that noteholders of failed banks were usually
compensated for their holdings.3 Second, the opponents have erroneou sly
equated the free banking period with a period of free compet ition .
Although potentia l entrants were free to enter without governmen t
sanction, the free banks were subject to numerous constraints and were
under close scrutiny by the state and the public 4 In fact, a prel iminary
investigation of the New York banking laws (one of the free banking states)
shows that the banking laws prior to the free banking period were more
lenient than the free banking laws. Based on the New York evidence, one
may contend that the free banking laws reregulated rather than
deregulated the banking market.

*Millsaps College
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BANKING LAWS IN NEW YORK PRIOR
TO THE FREE BANKING ERA
Between 1781 and 1804 , th e New Yor k legis latu re issued special
franchise ri ghts t o carryon the business of banking under i ncorporated
charters. The guidelines and privi leges of the incorporated banks were
specified in the charters iss ued by t he leg islature . The charters were
individually constructed ; each chapt er specified t he amount of capital, the
place of operations, and t he necessary t ransact ions of normal operations of
the bank. One function t hat characterized banks during this period was the
issuance of debt circulating as currency . The debt, commonly called
banknotes , were small denom i nated promissory notes that were
redeemable into specie on demand by the noteholder . The banks,
however, were not the only entities that could issue debt.s Any business
during this period could issue small denominated debt payable to the
bearer on demand . The stockholders of these uni ncorporated banks
were subject to unlimited personal liability, but they were not constrained
bylaw.
II

II

In 1804, New York enacted laws that distinguished the right to borrow
for business needs from the right to borrow with the intent to use the debt
as a medium of exchange . The effect of these restraints was to give the
state the exclusive right to delegate the privilege of banking.
Consequently, incorporated banks became the sole issuers of bank notes
and achieved monopoly status .
The practice of granting individual charters continued until 1828. In
1828 the legislature reformed the chartering system by enacting a general
banking law which required all charter banks approved thereaher, by the
legislature, to be subject to the provisions in the general bank ing law .
Some of the reforms of the general banki ng law were stri ngent. One
section of the law called for the unlimited liability of the directors and
stockholders. This section was repealed fifteen months later and was
replaced by the safety fund system . This system required all new banks to
contribute up to 3% of their capital to a special safety fund held by the
state bank commissioners. Creditors of insolvent safety fund charter banks
could apply to the fund for the outstanding debts of the bank . The
contemporaries of the amendment envisioned that the fund would provide
the necessary insurance for the bank creditors and therefore, release the
stockholders from their personal liability.
The amended general law contained five areas of reform . A synopsis
of the five reform areas is given in Table 1. The main objectives of the
reform were to specify the scope of operations; to protect the bank creditor
from losses; to establish the personal accountability of the stockholders and
directors; to limit the financial leverage of the chartered bank; and to set
guidelines for the maintenance of the capital stock .
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Table 1. New York Charter Bank Regulations
A. Capital Base Restrictions:
(1)

Capltallssetbycharter .

(2)

Withdrawa l of cap ital by stockholders thr o ugh excessive dividend or reduction of
capital from bad debts reqU ire corrective action by the directors.

B.

(3)

Hypothlcatlon of bank stock ISprohibited

(4)

Fraud u lent transfer of bank property IS prohibited

Financial Leverage:
(1)

Lo ans and discounts are limited to tw o and o ne half time s paid -in capital.

(2)

Bank notes Issued to the p ubliC are limited to tw o times paid -in capital

(3)

If Original capit al depreciates, bank IS required to call In loans In or der to maintain
statutory limits .

C.

Scope of Operations:
(1)

Bank pow ers are li m ited to disco unt ing bills , notes and other eVidences of debt;
receiving deposits ; bUYing and seiling of gold and silver bullion , COins and bills of
exchange ; ISSUing bills, note and other eViden ces of debt; and exercIsing such
other Incide ntal pow ers, as shall be necessary to carryon such bUSiness

(2)

Bankn otes denominated und er one dollar are prohibited .

(3)

Annual rate of Interest IS li m ite d to 6% .

(4)

Bankn otes payable at a later date With Interest are prohibited

(5)

Suspension of specie payments for 90 days results in forfeiture o f bank ing
privileges .

(6)

Purchase of real estate f or the bank 's portf o lio IS prohibited .

D. Accountability of Banking Operations:
(,)

Annual statement of finanC ial condit io ns IS required and del ivered to bank
commissioners .

E.

(2)

Bank commissioners are required to Inspect banks quarterly

(3)

Reports of commiSSioners are open to the public.

Safety of Bank Creditor:
(1)

Director is pers o nally liable t o st ockholders and credit o rs If d irector Violates any
statutory requirements 2

(2)

Liability to stockholders ISlimited to amount of shares subscribed J

(3)

Contributions to a speCial fund are required by all banks Each bank ISrequired t o
pay 3 % of capital to bank commiSSioner for the ultimate redemption of bank
liabilities of Insolvent banks

lApplled to banks established after 1825
2The original law called for the unlimited personal liability of st ockhol ders and directors
These statutes were repealed by the safety fund .
3Stockholder was liable for shares subscribed , even If the st ock holde r did not purchase all
the shares subscribed .
Source : Cleaveland and Hutchinson
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The reform legislation was revolutionary in several ways . First, it
clearly defined the functions of a bank . Prior to the reform legislation, the
charter defined the bank by the restraints imposed . The reform statute was
the first legal definition of th e bank's responsibilities. Second, the reforms
established an insurance fund for the bank creditors-the first of its kind .
Third, the reforms required, for the first time, annual reports from the
charter bank and created a supervisory panel to monitor the banks .
Finally, for the first time laws were enacted to prevent fraudulent
behavior . Such behavior would result in dissolution of banking privilege
and legal action . One reason for the enactment of these statutes as that
the director and stockholders of two charter banks were under
investigation for fraudulent practice during the years of reform .
The changes in the laws, however, did not prevent abuses within the
system .6 Some of the charter banks were found guilty of impropriety while
legislators were indicted for selling legislative favors'? Such corruption led
to the enactment of the free banking laws.

FREE BANKING LAWS
The regulators envisioned th e free banking laws as a means of
eliminating the problems associated with legislative approval of bank
charters, while establishing a system that would protect the noteholder.
The free banking laws allowed any number of persons to open a bank at
any time as long as the bank met minimum capital requirements. Once the
minimum capital was raised, a certificate of operations was filed with the
bank commissioners. Unlike charter banks, fr ee banks were prohibited
from printing banknotes. Free banks desiring to issue banknotes could
obtain banknotes from the bank commissioner by exchanging marketable
securities for the notes. The securities were held as collateral f or the
eventual redemption of the banknotes.
The f ree banking law also inc orporated a number of the charter
provisions: the prohibition of holding real estate as an income generating
asset; the requirement that th e capital stock be maintained; the restriction
on the maximum interest rate charged on loans and discounts; and the
requirement th at th e bank's financial condition be reported to the
commissioners.
However, the constitutionality of the free banking law was challenged
within the fi rst year of its enactment. Th e suit contended that th e free
banking law was improperly enacted. According t o th e New York
Constitution, a 2/3 vote of approval by the legislature was necessary for
incorporation and the free banking law was passed with less than 2/3 vote
of approval. But, th e free banking law specified that any number of
persons could gather to form an "association" for the purpose of banking.
Since the free banking law call ed th ese banks" associations" rather than
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corporations, it was believed that the constitutional requi remen t did not
apply.
The New York Supreme Court, however, ruled that the fre e bank
associations were corporations and that their legal existence was in
questi on . In 1846, an amended New York state constitution was approved
by the populace which established the legal existence of the free bank as a
corporation .
The recognition of corporate status implied that the fre e bank was
al so subject t o the reform legislation of 1828 and 1829, and exempt only
where t he free bank law specified otherwise .4 The areas of d istinction
between the laws are summarized in Table 2. An exam inati on of Tab le 2
i ndicates that the restrictions imposed on the free bank s were more
strin gent than the re str ictions on th e charter banks . In fact, the free
banking law placed additional responsibility on the free bank . For instance,
th e free banks were requi red to submit semi-annual re ports rather than
annual reports t o the bank commissions. In addition, these reports were to
be published in local newspapers. Charter banks had no such requirement .
Both restrictions improved the monitoring of the free bank by the public.
Free banks were also required t o secure their banknotes with
marketable securities. The market security reserve was in li eu of the safety
fund and effectively eliminated the financial leverage ceilin g placed on
charter banks. Although the prov isi on represented freed om to expand
liabilities, the provision also supplied valuable information to the
noteholder about the financial stability of the free bank . Current studies of
th e free banking period have found that free bank failures occurred during
periods of falling asset prices . S A fall in asset prices signaled to the
noteholder that the securities backing the banknotes may have
depreciated . 6 Potential expected losses from holding the banknotes
motivated the noteholders to go to the bank and redeem their banknotes.
Consequently, the market security provision established a new means of
evaluating the financial condition of the free bank's portfolio for the
noteholder.
The value of the information provided by the semi-annual reports and
by the market securities was magnified by the new provisions that gave the
noteholder legal rights to inspect the books of the bank and to initiate
dissolution proceedings. The free banking laws specified the legal recourse
when the free bank defaulted on a payment. If a free bank noteholder's
request for specie was refused, the noteholder could seek an injunct ion
against the bank by filing an affidavit of non-payment with the bank
commissioner. From the date of the fi ling, the free bank had 10 days to
comply with the noteholder's request, otherwise the bank commissioner
would be required to start dissolution proceedings . Noteholders of defunct
free banks were also compensated for the inconvenience . Free banks were
required to pay 14% interest to all noteholders . Such rights and
compensation were not granted to the charter bank noteholder.
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Table 2. Differences in the Reform laws and the Free Banking laws 1

A. Provisions Found in Both laws:
Free Bank

Charter Bank

(1 )

Report to commissioner

Semi-Annual

Annual

(2)

Grace period to honor

10 days

90 days

Accessib ility to the

a Open to public

Open to public

bank's record s

at commissioner's

at commissioner's

office

office

the payment of
banknotes

(3)

b Open to creditor
or stockholder whose
Investment IS equal
to or greater than
$1 ,000
(4)

B.

Security of Bank

Mar ke t Security

Creditors

Reserve

Safety Fund

Provisions Pertaining to Free Banks:
(1)

Semi -annual reports to be published In local newspapers of free bank

(2)

Noteholders have the right to start proceedings against free banks for the failure
of redemption .

(3)

Noteholder has first lien on the assets .

(4)

Free banks are required to establish a specie reserve at the bank equal to 12t% of
ci rculating bank notes .

(5)

Unlimited expansion of assets and liabilities

(6)

Penalty for defaulting on noteholders request of specie of 14% per annum .

lThe companson IS between the reform laws and the onglnal free banking law Subsequent
changes In the free banking law are not considered
So urce : Cleaveland and Hutchinson

Th e laws also gave the noteholder of $1000 or more the right to
examine the financial records of the banks at any time . However, the law
required the noteholder t o have an officer of t he court to assist in the
examinati on .7 If in the judgment of the noteholder and the court officer
the investments were deemed unsound, then proceedings against the free
bank would be initiated .
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CONCLUSION
The comparison of the free banking law and the charter. regulations
in dicates that free banks and charter banks operated under similar
co nstraints. Many of th e constraints imposed on the free bank were carried
over from the charter banking system when the Supreme Court ruled that
charter regulations also applied to the free bank. The major distinction of
free access t o the market for free banks still held . However, in exchange for
th e freedom to enter, more stringent constraints were imposed and new
restrictions were enacted . The most notable modification was the 100%
market security reserve in lieu of the safety fund . New restrictions required
more information and greater access to the financial records of the free
bank and the legal rights of the noteholder were specified .
Two implications can be drawn from this comparison . First, th e free
bankin g laws reregulated rather than deregulated the banking market.
The comparison in Table 2 shows that the regulations governing the free
banks were more restrictive than those placed on the charter banks .
Secondly, the argument by deregulation opponents th at the free banking
market was an experiment in free competition that failed is unsupported by
this comparison . Instead of characterizing the free banking experience as
one governed by free market competition, the experi ence should be
viewed in light of the new restrictions . The determ ination of the im pact of
the restrictions on the free banking laws on the free banking experience
would provide better insight into the possible causes of bank failures and
provide a better basis for current banking policy.
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ENDNOTES
1.

Milton Friedman, one of the staunchest supporters of free enterprise,
rejects the notion of laissez-faire banking . He argues that while it has
some merit "it could not, however, solve t he problems of i nherent
instability." Milton Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability, (New
York : Fordham University Press, 1959).

2.

Arthur Rolnick and Warren E. Weber, "New Evidences on the Free
Banking Era", American Economic Review 73 (December 1983) : 10801091 .

3.

Detailed discussions on the abuses of the system in New York are
presented in Robert E. Chaddock, The Safety Fund Banking System in
New York 1829- 1866, (Was hin gton : Government Printing Office,
1910) p. 376 and in P. Cleaveland and G.S. Hutchinson, The Banking
System of the State of New York, (New York : J. S. Voorshies, 1864 :
Reprint ed ., New York : Arno Press, 1980) p. LlX .

4.

In Cleaveland , page 8, the Supreme Court decision is given . It states
t hat "free banks 'a re corporations and that they are subject to th e
general provision of the law which are applicable to like corporations,
except where the above act and subsequent legislation have
otherwise provided .'"

5.

A . Rolnick and W .E. Weber contend that one of the constraints may
have caused some of t he problems of the period; see "The Causes of
Free Bank Failures: A Detail Explanation", Journal of Monetary Theory
14 (October 1984), pp . 267-291.

6.

The information on the free bank's portfolio was available to the
. public. In one instance, th e New York Times of January 16, 1853
provided a complete listing of all t he securities held as collateral for
banknotes . Banker Magazine (a monthly newspaper) would also
provide information on new banks that entered the market and the
securities that backed the banknotes.

7.

Stockholders of the free bank also had the right to inspect the books
of the bank at any time .
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